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Executive Summary
Municipalities across the Province are grappling with infrastructure deficits.
Small, northern, and rural municipality’s tax assessment base limits its ability to
garner sufficient revenue to support operations as well as renew and replace
infrastructure. Federal and Provincial governments must step in and assist. As a
result the Province introduced the Ontario Community Infrastructure Fund (OCIF)
as a permanent program to fund critical infrastructure projects for core assets roads, bridges, water and wastewater.
This research paper seeks to determine if the Province can efficiently and
effectively re-distribute revenue using existing financial and statistical data to local
governments and to investigate the effectiveness of an application-based approach
for infrastructure grants.

2
Acknowledgements
First, I would like to thank my advisor, Jennifer Kirkham.
Next, I must thank my new manager Margaret Neubauer, Senior Director,
Corporate Services for the Niagara Parks Commission. Thank you for putting your
faith in me and being extremely patient while I finished my research paper.
To my colleague, Lise Gagnon, your wordsmith skills and your pointed
questions really helped me make my point. Your knowledge of the municipal world
was beneficial and necessary to critique my work and this paper. Thank you for
volunteering your time.
Also I must thank my BFFs, placed in order of tenure not importance, Debbie
Williams, Nicole Caballero, Janet Disher, and Cathy Simpson. Thank you for the loads
and loads of encouragement. It is very much appreciated.
I am so blessed to have two of the brightest and smartest men for sons, Brent
and Craig Asselin. Thank you for your encouragement and honest criticism. I know
that you were only trying to ensure that I didn’t get too “mathy” and reach beyond
my comfort zone. Your data mining skills and math advice were awesome. Everyday
you amaze me with what you can do and what you know.
And finally, my husband Steve Flanagan, thank you for letting me complete
the Master of Public Administration program. Now that it’s done, let’s enjoy the
farm, our standard poodle Mac, and our friends. I promise you this, no more school!

3

Table of Contents
INTRODUCTION

5

RESEARCH QUESTION

7

BACKGROUND

9

GRANT STRUCTURE
INTERGOVERNMENTAL TRANSFERS
FEDERAL AND PROVINCIAL GRANTS
MUNICIPAL REPORTING
TOOLS TO MITIGATE THE INFRASTRUCTURE DEFICIT

9
12
13
16
17

ONTARIO COMMUNITY INFRASTRUCTURE FUND

21

METHODOLOGY

25

RESEARCH DESIGN
ANALYSIS OF KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS

25
27

RESULTS AND INTERPRETATION OF DATA

31

GROUP CASE ANALYSIS
APPLICATION EFFECTIVENESS

38
43

CONCLUSION

47

BIBLIOGRAPHY

49

4
List of Tables and Charts:

Page

Table 1 – Results of R2 Calculation Page

27

Table 2 – Average Operating Surplus Ratio

32

Table 3 – Average Current Ratio

33

Table 4 – Average Rates Coverage Ratio

34

Table 5 – Average Debt Service Coverage Ratio

35

Table 6 – Average Asset Sustainability Ratio

36

Table 7 – Average Asset Consumption

37

Table 8 – KPI for County of Oxford

39

Table 9 – KPI for Township of Wellesley

40

Table 10 – KPI for Township of Plummer Additional

41

Table 11 – KPI for Municipality of Highlands East

42

Table 12 – KPI for City of Peterborough

42

5

Introduction
Municipalities own the vast majority of Canada’s infrastructure assets but
have very few revenue tools, mainly property taxes and user fees, to raise funds for
the maintenance, replacement, and construction of capital assets. “Municipalities
own over 60% of the country’s infrastructure but collect just eight cents of every tax
dollar paid in Canada, with the other 92 cents going to federal, provincial and
territorial governments” (Federation of Canadian Municipalities, 2015).
Underinvestment in public infrastructure has created municipal infrastructure
deficits across the province. The chart below (Ontario, 2016) outlines capital
spending from 1956 to 2001 and highlights the: 1) era of visionary investment, 2)
era of neglect, and 3) era of renewal.
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The chart demonstrates a significant investment per capita in infrastructure from
1956 to 1975, which defines the era of visionary investment. However, for the 25year period between 1976 and 2000, the era of neglect, infrastructure spending per
capita was primarily nonexistent. “For 25 years Canadians have watched the
symptoms of the infrastructure deficit grow: rusting bridges, crumbling roads,
crowded buses and subways, and thousands of drinking water warnings”
(Federation of Canadian Municipalities, 2015). Well-maintained public
infrastructure is necessary for the health of the economy and quality of life.
Grants from senior levels of government are important to the fiscal health of
local governments. It can be argued that a municipality has taxing authority and can
raise funds for infrastructure investment through property taxes, but the ability of a
small municipality to raise sufficient funds for infrastructure is limited by its
assessment base. Equalization payments through grants or intergovernmental
transfers from senior levels of government are required to assist municipalities with
infrastructure needs. It can also be argued that municipalities are the creation of the
Province and must be accountable to the Province but where does that leave the role
of municipal councils and residents in shaping their communities.
The following research paper is an investigation into the effectiveness of the
application-based approach to the re-distribution of revenue or grants from senior
levels of government to local governments. The goal of the research is to determine
if the Province has enough data, both financial and statistical, to allocate funding for
infrastructure needs using a needs-based grant allocation. Based on this
information, this paper poses the following research question.
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Research Question
Does the Province have enough financial and statistical data available
to execute a needs-based grant allocation to target municipal
infrastructure investment instead of utilizing an application process to
allocate funds?
This paper will be structured as follows:
1. Background – A comprehensive background will be provided including
examples of successful grants, evidence of municipal reporting burden, and
current tools to mitigate infrastructure deficits.
2. Methodology – A detailed account of the design and data used to answer the
research question will be provided in this section.
3. Results and Interpretation of Data – All data collected will be presented
and organized. This section will also include interpretation of the data.
4. Conclusion – This section will provide final thoughts on the research and
proposed recommendations for the Province.
Municipalities are creations of the Province. The Province enacts boundaries,
mandates responsibilities, sets standards for service delivery, limits own-source
revenues to property taxes and user fees, and establishes borrowing limits for
municipalities. “The good news is that the high degree of provincial control over
local governments in Canada means that there cannot be any visible fiscal crisis at
the local level” but “the bad news, however, is that municipal governments in
Canada have only very limited fiscal autonomy and are constrained from solving the
problems they may have” (Slack E. , Provincial-Local Fiscal Transfers in Canada,
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2009). This research is important because it explores whether there is a method
available, using existing data, to balance control of municipal spending and garner
efficiencies for revenue re-distribution for senior levels of government, while at the
same time allowing municipalities the ability to solve local infrastructure deficits.
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Background
The following is a comprehensive background on Federal and Provincial
grants including a discussion of grant structure, examples of grants, municipal
reporting to the Province, tools to mitigate infrastructure deficits, and the new
Ontario Community Infrastructure Fund which is the focus of the research. This
section of the paper will include a discussion on grant structure, intergovernmental
transfers, federal and provincial grants, municipal reporting, and tools to mitigate
infrastructure deficits. The background will provide insight into grant
administration and potential obstacles with the current granting system.

Grant Structure
Grants or intergovernmental transfers from senior levels of government are
divided into two categories, conditional/earmarked and unconditional.
Unconditional grants have an income effect on local governments and conditional
grants have both a price and income effect (Slack E. , Local Fiscal Response to
Intergovernmental Transfers, 1980). Therefore the donor government will select
either a conditional or unconditional grant depending on the senior level
government’s desired local fiscal response.
Literature regarding grants and intergovernmental transfers is extensive.
Shah and Slack argue provincial-municipal transfers are designed to address the
following issues: 1) vertical fiscal imbalance, 2) horizontal fiscal imbalance, 3)
externalities, and 4) as a response to political lobbying or to exert control (Shah,
2007) (Slack E. , 2007).
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Vertical Fiscal Imbalance
“A vertical imbalance occurs when municipalities have inadequate ownsource revenues to meet expenditure responsibilities” (Slack E. , Provincial-Local
Fiscal Transfers in Canada, 2009, p. 17). The fiscal gap can be closed by the use of an
unconditional or conditional grant or by revenue sharing. If the grant is
unconditional the funds can be spent at the municipality’s discretion. Conditional
grants must be spent on provincially or federally mandated projects. The grant is
typically allocated using a formula but to be an effective tool to increase municipal
revenues, the allocation must be stable and predictable (Slack E. , Provincial-Local
Fiscal Transfers in Canada, 2009). An example of a conditional vertical fiscal grant is
Ontario’s commitment to share 2 cents per litre of gasoline revenue with
municipalities for public transit (Toronto Transit, 2015).
Horizontal Fiscal Imbalance
“Horizontal fiscal imbalance refers to the difference in resources among
governments at the same level” (Slack E. , Provincial-Local Fiscal Transfers in
Canada, 2009, p. 19). Municipalities across the province have very different
characteristics, which can limit its ability to raise the necessary resources to deliver
consistent and comparable levels of service. Equalization payments are required in
order to ensure comparable levels of service are delivered across the province.
Formulas are used to determine equalization allocations but allocations must be
stable and predictable to ensure province-wide comparable services (Slack E. ,
Provincial-Local Fiscal Transfers in Canada, 2009).
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Externalities
Externalities occur when the benefit and cost of a service cascades over
multiple municipal boundaries. Externalities may result in under spending due to
perceived benefits accruing outside municipal boundaries, for example, regional
roads. To diffuse the effect of externalities, the province will utilize conditional,
matching grants (Slack E. , Provincial-Local Fiscal Transfers in Canada, 2009).
Political
“Transfers are sometimes established in response to successful lobbying by
municipal associations” but frequently “provincial governments often use transfers
as a way to exert control over how municipalities deliver services” (Slack E. ,
Provincial-Local Fiscal Transfers in Canada, 2009, p. 23). Conditional grants that do
not require matching funds are an excellent tool to fund projects that are a priority
for the province but a low priority for a local government, for example the delivery
of land ambulance that was downloaded to the local level in 1998. Conditional nonmatching grants encourage “local governments to act as agents of the donor
government” (Slack E. , Provincial-Local Fiscal Transfers in Canada, 2009, p. 23). The
Province sets service standards for the project or program and the Province also
benefits from the program being delivered locally (Boadway & Shah, 2009).
Through the use of different grant structures the Province can exert control
over expenditures at the local level. This is important because municipalities are
creatures of the Province and act as agents of the Province when providing services
to residents. Even with grants as a mechanism to ensure service standards are
achieved, there are still obstacles related to intergovernmental transfers.
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Intergovernmental Transfers
Transfers need to be designed to ensure recipients have a clear mandate, and
have some flexibility to make decisions but are held accountable for spending
decisions (Bird & Vaillancourt, 1998). Yet, there are still obstacles to overcome with
grants.
In a paper prepared for a 2009 Conference on Grants vs. Earmarked Grants:
Theory and Practice titled Provincial-Local Fiscal Transfers in Canada: Provincial
Control Trumps Local Accountability, author Enid Slack discusses intergovernmental
transfers and “evaluates the extent to which they are designed to increase local
accountability or maintain provincial control” (Slack E. , Provincial-Local Fiscal
Transfers in Canada: Provincial Control Trumps Local Authority, 2009, p. 2). Slack’s
paper concludes that based on her research, grants are designed to achieve
provincial objectives not local fiscal autonomy.
Slack argues that potential obstacles for grants include: 1) interference with
efficient delivery of service, 2) local decision making distortion, 3) reduced
accountability, and 4) the fact that transfers are rarely stable and predictable.
Interference with efficient delivery of service: Slack’s research finds that
transfers interfere with the efficient delivery of services. Slack contends that there is
no incentive for municipalities to use proper pricing for services if grants cover a
large portion of operating and capital costs.
Local decision making distortion: Transfers can distort decision-making at the
local level. In order to qualify for a grant, projects that are not a real priority for the
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community may get prioritized over other projects in an effort to garner any amount
of grant funding.
Reduced accountability: Transfers can reduce accountability. Slack argues that
accountability can be blurred when municipalities are making spending decisions
while another level of government is raising the funds.
Transfers are rarely stable and predictable: The final and most important issue
that Slack identifies relating to transfers is that they are rarely stable and
predictable, which makes planning for infrastructure improvements at the local
level difficult.

Federal and Provincial Grants
Senior levels of government have introduced various grants to assist
municipalities with operating and capital funding and to address the revenue
imbalance between the levels of government. Two of these grants are Canada Gas
Tax, and Ontario Municipal Partnership Fund (OMPF).
Canada Gas Tax
The Canada Gas Tax fund, a conditional federal grant administered by the
Association of Municipalities of Ontario (AMO), was introduced in 2005 and has
become a stable and predictable source of funding to assist municipalities with
infrastructure investments. Funds are allocated on a per capita basis and municipal
allocation estimates are available to 2018. Estimates from 2019 to 2024 will be
based on the 2016 census. There is a requirement to identify municipal
infrastructure projects that will be funded by Canada Gas Tax and to report the
performance measures and outcomes achieved. With a stable and predictable flow
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of funding, Municipal Councils and staff can plan for important infrastructure
investments well into the future.
The Canada Gas Tax fund has matured. Municipalities were once required to
hire external auditors to confirm that Gas Tax funding was used appropriately and
in accordance with agreements. In 2009, Infrastructure Canada conducted a
program evaluation on the Gas Tax fund and found that the program “addressed a
demonstrated need for investment in municipal infrastructure, and provided
flexibility and predictability to local governments” and was “found to be efficient
cost-effective and accountable” (AMO, 2017). As a result of the positive evaluation
results, the audit scope migrated from the conventional audit approach to a risk
based audit approach. Now AMO randomly audits only 10% of municipalities to
ensure compliance with the program.
Canada Gas Tax provides a stable, predictable, and flexible funding source for
municipal infrastructure needs. It has reduced the reporting burden for a
municipality because it does not require an application process to compete for funds
and recently, the requirement of a financial audit to ensure compliance has been
discontinued. The grant is also easy to administer for the federal government
because AMO oversees the program. AMO is an association of Ontario municipalities
that works together to achieve goals and meet common challenges. Grant allocations
are formula-based and are allocated based on recent census population data.
Ontario Municipal Partnership Fund
The OMPF grant has been assisting municipalities since approximately 2003.
It is an unconditional grant and it is the Province’s main transfer payment to 388
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municipalities. The total funding envelope for 2017 is $505 million and the Province
has made a commitment to continue this grant into the future. In 2014, the grant
was redesigned to focus assistance on northern and rural municipalities with
challenging fiscal circumstances. OMPF has four grant components: 1) assessment
equalization, 2) northern communities grant, 3) rural communities grant, and 4)
northern and rural fiscal circumstances grant. The Province uses a number of data
inputs and measures to allocate funds across the 388 participants. For example:
number of households, weighted tax assessment per household, rural and small
communities measure, farm measure, northern and rural fiscal circumstances
measure, guaranteed level of support, and the prior year allocation. Since the grant
is unconditional there is no special reporting for spending, no audits to comply with,
applications to complete, or municipal competition for funds.
The benefit of OMPF is that it targets small, rural and northern municipalities
but uses data to quantify the allocation per municipality. It does not have complex
reporting requirements such as an application process to compete for funds.
Administration is easy for the province due to the formula-based allocation of the
funds. Allocation of the grant and formulas are posted on the web making the
process very transparent and defensible.
Canada Gas Tax and OMPF are predictable, long-term, and stable revenue
sources for municipalities. Both grants are targeted to specific municipal needs. All
municipalities receive Canada Gas Tax funds and it must be spent on municipal
infrastructure. Only 388 municipalities receive OMPF but the grant is targeted to
assist northern and rural municipalities with challenging fiscal circumstances. Both
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grants have minimal reporting requirements, which reduce the reporting burden on
municipalities. More importantly, both Canada Gas Tax and OMPF allocate funds
based on available financial and statistical data (AMO, 2017) (Ontario, 2016).

Municipal Reporting
Over time, provincial reporting requirements for municipalities has
increased. New provincial programs and grant applications have made reporting
more complex for municipalities. “Steadily municipalities became deeply over
regulated and burdened with requirements to report to the province on hundreds of
programs and services” (Lobo, 2017, p. 25). “Reporting threatens to weaken
municipal productivity at a time when municipalities must modernize to face
increasing demands” (Lobo, 2017, p. 25).
Conditional grants can have significant reporting requirements when compared
to the reporting requirements for unconditional grants. Many conditional grants
require formal expressions of interest, complex applications, municipal competition
for funds, senior government review and ranking, grant financial audits, and final
project reporting. Reporting to senior levels of government has become
burdensome for municipalities when the average resident is more concerned with
what is tangible and visible such as good roads and garbage pickup (Lobo, 2017).
Lobo argues that municipal reporting to the Province is “onerous and
excessive” (Lobo, 2017, p. 26) and has surveyed municipalities across the province.
Figure 1 (Lobo, 2017, p. 25) demonstrates that 48% of respondents agree that
Provincial reporting requirements are impacting the ability of municipal
practitioners to productively deliver services.
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Tools to Mitigate the Infrastructure Deficit
Together the Province and municipalities have developed tools to mitigate
municipal infrastructure deficits by using: 1) capital asset inventories and
amortization, 2) long-range capital plans, and 3) asset management plans.
Capital Asset Inventories
A municipality’s capital assets are an important economic resource and are
fundamental to the delivery of municipal programs and services. In recognition of
the importance of tangible capital assets (TCA), the Public Sector Accounting Board
(PSAB) issued new financial reporting standards, section 3150 of the PSAB
handbook, with respect to municipal assets. As of January 1, 2009, PSAB required
that all TCA be recorded and amortized for municipal financial statements. Prior to
2009, municipal financial statements did not include any information relating to the
nature and age of a municipality’s assets. Historical cost, accumulated depreciation,
and remaining useful life data on infrastructure assets are valuable when
forecasting the maintenance and the replacement of a municipality’s infrastructure
assets. The Province also amended the 2009 Financial Information Return (FIR) to
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include TCA. The benefit of imposing TCA for financial statements and the FIR is that
the data is standardized across municipalities and available for analytical and
planning purposes.
Long-Range Capital Plans
Capital planning is part of most municipalities’ long-range strategic plans.
Prior to TCA, the municipal operating and capital budget processes were typically on
an annual cycle. However, with a greater emphasis on TCA, most municipalities have
transitioned to at least a 3-year capital budget and many have moved to a 5 or 10year cycle. The capital budget process is an excellent planning tool. Staff prepares
and Council approves the capital budget based on the community’s needs. There are
two issues with capital plans across the province: 1) capital budgets are prepared
in-house and therefore the format is not standardized which limits its analytical use,
and 2) Council’s requests for capital projects may be politically motivated and may
not take into consideration value for money.
Asset Management Plans
Asset management planning is the process of making optimal decisions
relating to the building and operating, maintaining and disposing of infrastructure
assets. The objective of an Asset Management Plan (AMP) is to maximize the
benefits of a municipality’s assets, manage the risk, and provide satisfactory service
levels to the public in a sustainable manner. Using the information from an AMP,
council and staff can determine asset deficiencies, assess remaining useful life, and
plan for future maintenance. Ideally AMPs help identify the optimal time in an

19
asset’s useful life to make repairs in order to avoid a total “rip and replace” of the
asset. Figure 1 below (Ontario, 2016) demonstrates the savings that can be achieved
from proper asset management planning by identifying deterioration of assets early
and by taking action to rehabilitate the asset throughout its useful life cycle.

Municipalities were required to have AMPs prepared and approved by
councils by December 2013 for core infrastructure assets such as roads, bridges,
water, and wastewater assets. Many municipalities hurried to comply because AMPs
were required to meet eligibility requirements for grants. This produced AMPs that
were ineffective for successful planning. Also, because various consultants from
across the province created many municipalities’ AMPs, the non-standardized
formats limited analytical use at the Provincial level.
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Long-term capital budgets, TCA, and AMPs are helpful tools to mitigate
municipal infrastructure deficits and focus capital spending on the most critical
assets. These tools could become more beneficial through standardization. Once in
a standardized format, capital budgets and AMPs could be used to determine
municipalities with critical infrastructure needs across the Province in a consistent
and defensible methodical manner.
Next, the paper will provide an overview on the newly implemented Ontario
Community Infrastructure Fund.
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Ontario Community Infrastructure Fund
In 2014, the Province introduced the Ontario Community Infrastructure
Fund (OCIF) as a permanent program to fund critical infrastructure projects for core
assets - roads, bridges, water and wastewater. Small Ontario municipalities with
populations under 100,000 and municipalities north of the Districts of Parry Sound
and Nipissing qualify for the formula-based component and can also apply for the
application-based component. Local Service Boards, agencies contracted by the
Province to provide municipal services in a community but are not part of an
incorporated municipality, also qualify for OCIF.
OCIF, as previously mentioned, has a formula-based component. The total
formula-based funding envelope for 2017 is approximately $95 million and the
minimum annual funding per eligible municipality is $50,000, which represents a
$25,000 increase over the initial program minimum. The formula-based component
is calculated using the following four steps:
Step 1: Determine the amount of core infrastructure owned by the
municipality from the Financial Information Return. The best of the 2014 or
2015 FIR data is used – whichever yields a higher value for the municipality,
Step 2: Calculate the infrastructure index by comparing a municipality’s core
infrastructure to its weighted property assessment and median household
income,
Step 3: Determine the funding per $100,000 of core infrastructure by
evaluating a municipality’s infrastructure index and how it relates to the
median infrastructure index of all eligible municipalities, and
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Step 4: Calculate the grant using the infrastructure index or $50,000
whichever is greater (Province of Ontario, 2017).
Weighted property assessment is taxable assessment multiplied by the appropriate
tax ratios. Tax ratios distribute the tax burden between property tax classes relative
to the residential tax ratio, which is “one”. The tax ratio for a commercial property is
set higher than a residential property as the assumption is that a commercial
property consumes municipal services at a higher ratio than a residential property.
OCIF also has an Application-based Component. Approximately $100 million
will be allocated through the application-based component for the fiscal year 201718 intake top-up. Application-based eligibility is restricted to core infrastructure
projects that are part of a municipality’s AMP, capital construction for new core
infrastructure that will address health and safety concerns, and capital maintenance
for the rehabilitation or replacement of core infrastructure. Municipalities must
prepare and submit applications to the Province annually in late spring. The
Province will review and evaluate each project on its merits and then award funding
to the successful applicants.
The benefit of the new OCIF is that it provides steady, long-term funding for
small, rural, and northern communities to build and maintain capital assets by
providing targeted funding for critical core infrastructure projects. Another benefit
of OCIF is its transparency. The Province posts the amount of the municipal formulabased grant as well as the successful application-based project descriptions and
grant amounts. A major disadvantage of OCIF is the application process. OCIF has
two granting components: 1) a formula-based component, and 2) an application-
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based component. The latter requires a written application, municipal competition,
provincial scrutiny, and grant reporting.
As a result of the OCIF application-based process, grant writing firms have
sprung up offering assistance to draft grant applications. The fees can be excessive
for small municipalities, between 25% and 40% of the total grant if the application
is successful. OCIF grants are non-matching. A matching grant requires a
municipality to provide a portion of its own source revenues to qualify for funding.
The use of a grant-writing firm transforms a non-matching grant to a matching grant
because the fees must be raised through own source revenues, placing a strain on
remaining municipal programs and services.
There is limited information regarding OCIF application-based grant
allocations, for example how many applications are submitted and for what projects,
or what criteria, other than health and safety concerns, is used to select
municipalities that are worthy of funds. Councils want to know why their
application was not successful and why their municipality did not receive funding.
This paper aims to determine if the province has enough data available,
financial and statistical, to effectively allocate funds based on infrastructure need.
Data from the Provincial Financial Information Returns (Ministry of Municipal
Affairs, 2015) and geographical coordinates (Wikipedia) were used to assess the
Province’s ability to allocate funds for infrastructure. Further details on the data
analysis to assess the Province’s ability to allocate funds based on need, will be
discussed in the appropriate sections of this paper.
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This research paper is concerned with municipal infrastructure deficits, the
burden of provincial reporting for municipalities, and how funds from senior levels
of government can be allocated efficiently and effectively to municipalities with
infrastructure needs.
This paper argues that the application-based component of the OCIF grant
exacerbates the burden of municipal reporting to the Province, reduces
transparency, and impairs consistency at the Provincial level. This paper aims to
determine if the Province has enough data available, financial and statistical, to
effectively allocate funds to the local level based on infrastructure need. Information
from the Provincial Financial Information Returns (Ministry of Municipal Affairs,
2015) and geographical coordinates (Wikipedia) were used to assess the Province’s
ability to allocate funds for infrastructure. Details on the data analysis to assess the
province’s ability to allocate funds based on need, will be discussed in the next
sections of this paper.
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Methodology
The following section provides the framework used to answer the research
question:
Does the Province have enough financial and statistical data available
to execute a needs-based grant allocation to target municipal
infrastructure investment instead of utilizing an application process to
allocate funds?
The Financial Information Return (FIR) is the main data collection tool used
by the Ministry of Municipal Affairs to collect annual financial and statistical
information from municipalities across the Province of Ontario. The FIR is a
standardized document with multiple schedules. The Ministry updates the FIR
annually to comply with new legislation and PSAB reporting requirements. For
example, the 2009 FIR was updated to include tangible capital asset information. To
assist municipalities with the accurate completion of the FIR it was designed to
include automatic calculations, verification checks, carry forward data, and opening
balances. All municipalities must submit an FIR balanced to the audited financial
statements on or before May 31 for the previous December 31 year-end. Failure to
submit an FIR to the Province may impact future grant funding opportunities.

Research Design
The data points contained in the 2015 FIR were downloaded from the
Ministry of Municipal Affairs – Financial Information Return website (Province of
Ontario) for all municipalities. The data was then matched with the OCIF Intake 1,
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Intake2, Intake 3 (application-based component) as well as the OCIF formula-based
component amounts for the year 2015. Local Service Boards receiving grant funding
were excluded from any analysis contained in this paper. Longitude and latitude
coordinates were also provided for each municipality since one of the criteria of
eligibility for OCIF is that the municipality must be north of the Districts of Parry
Sound and Nipissing. Any municipality that did not receive formula-based or
application-based OCIF was ignored in the data sets.
The Province utilized either the 2014 or 2015 FIR when calculating the
formula-based component of the OCIF grant. Therefore 2015 FIR data was selected
for use in this research design. In an effort to explain the OCIF Intake (applicationbased component of the grant) the coefficient of determination or R-squared (R2)
value was used to derive the correlations between the dependent variables (OCIF
grant amounts) and the independent variables (2015 FIR data points). “R-squared is
a statistical measure of how close data are fitted to a regression line” (Frost, 2013).
The following permutations of data were computed:
1) OCIF Intake 1 and 2015 data points
2) OCIF Intake 2 and 2015 data points
3) OCIF Intake 3 and 2015 data points
4) Total OCIF Intake and 2015 data points
5) Total Intake plus 2015 formula-based component and 2015 data points,
and
6) 2015 formula-based component and 2015 data points.
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The results of the computation are provided in Table 1.
Table 1 –
2
Results of R
Calculation
Average R
Squared
Minimum R
Squared
Maximum R
Squared
Standard
Deviation

OCIF Intake
One

OCIF Intake
Two

OCIF Intake
Three

Total
OCIF Intake

Total Intake
plus 2015
Formula

2015
Formula

0.0070180287

0.0112201046

0.0043468216

0.0064694769

0.0170352799

0.2257165912

0.0000000315

0.0000001100

0.0000000289

0.0000001361

0.0000001568

0.0000005115

0.1004097829

0.0961602613

0.0315362923

0.0918668803

0.1048305676

0.9197047292

0.0113361059

0.0148745161

0.0042322892

0.0103195552

0.0204097149

0.2656483104

Since the R2 values and standard deviation are low for scenarios 1 through 5
there is minimal correlation between the dependent and independent variables.
Therefore a statistical model using regression analysis to estimate the relationship
between the OCIF application-based grant and 2015 FIR data points and to predict
future grant amounts was not predictive. Appendix A contains the full computation
for all data points. To test the concept, the 2015 formula-based grant was also run
though the same computation. Scenario 6 produced significant R2 values and
standard deviation, which was to be expected since the Province uses similar data to
calculate the formula-based OCIF grant amounts. Since this methodology was not
effective to predict the OCIF application-based grants using regression analysis,
further analysis was performed using the FIR’s key performance indicators for all
municipalities for the years 2011 through to 2015.

Analysis of Key Performance Indicators
Key performance indicators (KPI) measure how well an organization is
achieving critical organizational objectives. The Ministry has developed six KPIs to
assess the financial health of municipalities:
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1) Operating Surplus Ratio: The Operating Surplus Ratio, expressed as a
percentage, is an indicator of the extent to which revenues raised cover
operational expenses only or are available for capital infrastructure. A
negative ratio indicates the percentage increase required to achieve break
even. Operating Surplus is calculated by dividing a municipality’s net
operating surplus by its total rates (property taxes, user fees, and service
charges) revenue. The target ratio for a municipality is between 1% and 15%.
A ratio over 15% is considered advanced by the Ministry.
2) Current Ratio: The Current Ratio is a measure of a municipality’s ability to
pay short-term obligations. Current Ratio is calculated by dividing current
assets by current liabilities. The target is greater than 1:1 ratio.
3) Rates Coverage Ratio: The Rates Coverage Ratio is a measure of the
municipality’s ability to cover its expenditures through its own revenue.
Rates Coverage Ratio is calculated by dividing the total rates revenue by the
total operating expense. The basic target is 40 to 60%, intermediate is 60 to
90%, and the advanced target is greater that 90%.
4) Debt Service Coverage Ratio: The Debt Service Coverage Ratio is a measure of
a municipality’s ability to service its debt payments. To calculate a
municipality’s Debt Service Coverage Ratio, the operating surplus before
interest and amortization is divided by the sum of principle and interest
payments. The target ratio is 2.
5) Asset Sustainability Ratio: The Asset Sustainability Ratio is an approximation
of the extent to which a municipality is replacing, or acquiring new assets as
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existing infrastructure reaches the end of its useful life. The target is greater
than 90%. A municipality with a ratio less than 90% is not sufficiently
maintaining its infrastructure assets. This course of action may result in a
reduced level of service and may place a greater burden on future ratepayers.
The Asset Sustainability Ratio is calculated by dividing asset additions by
annual amortization expense.
6) Asset Consumption Ratio: The Asset Consumption Ratio estimates the age of
a municipality’s physical assets. It measures the extent to which depreciable
assets have been consumed by comparing the total depreciation of assets
against the historical cost. A target less than 25% signifies new
infrastructure, 26% to 50% signifies moderately new infrastructure, 51% to
75% signifies moderately old infrastructure, and over 75% signifies old
infrastructure. The Asset Consumption Ratio is calculated by dividing the
closing amortization balance by the closing historical cost balance.
KPIs were downloaded from the FIR website for all municipalities for the years
2011 through to 2015. At the time of the download, 2016 FIR was not available. Data
from 2011 to 2014 was used to identify KPI trends prior to OCIF grants. KPI data
from 2015 may identify improvements related to 2015 formula and Intake 1 grants.
The municipalities were organized into three groups:
1) Group 1 – Municipalities (27) that were not eligible for OCIF and did not
receive any application or formula-based funding,
2) Group 2 – Municipalities (268) that received only the annual formula-based
OCIF grant, and
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3) Group 3 – Municipalities (147) that received both application and formulabased OCIF grant.
An average was calculated by year, for each group, and for each KPI measure. For
some KPIs where the measure was zero, for example Debt Service Coverage Ratio,
“N/A” replaced the zero as to not skew the average calculation. Group averages for
each KPI were placed in a table and then plotted on a line chart. The next section of
this report will provide the results and an interpretation of the data. Appendix B
contains Group 1 data, Appendix C contains Group 2 data, and Appendix C contains
Group 3 data.
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Results and Interpretation of Data
This section provides the results of the KPI analysis. It includes an
interpretation of the results for the time frame leading up to OCIF and evaluates the
impact of the first formula and the effectiveness of application-based grants. It also
provides a selection of specific municipalities, both recipients and non-recipients of
Intake funds, detailing the impact of OCIF grants on its KPIs.
Operating Surplus Ratio:
Operating Surplus Ratio is an indicator of the extent to which revenues raised
cover operational expenses only or are available for capital infrastructure. Average
Operating Surplus Ratios were calculated and graphed in Table 2. For ease of
representation, the target mid-point (7.5%) was used.
Table 2 demonstrates that on average Group 1 has the ability to raise
revenues to support its operating and instrastructure requirements through its
rates revenue as well as the current levels of senior government assistance. This
group is also trending in an upward direction from the target suggesting that
operating surpluses are increasing. Group 2 and Group 3 were struggling to meet
operating and capital requirements prior to 2014 but are now trending away from
the limit since the initiation of OCIF. This paper would argure that after analyzing
the average Operating Surplus Ratios across the Province, the OCIF formula and
application grants are effectively targeting municipalities with lower Operating
Surplus Ratios. In municipalities, operating expenses take priorty over capital
projects. Lower ratios indicate a reduced ability to fund infrastructure needs.
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Current Ratio:
The Current Ratio is a measure of a municipality’s ability to pay short-term
obligations. Average Current Ratios were calculated and graphed in Table 3.
Table 3 indicates that all groups on average are maintaining a consistent
level for the Current Ratio and are all exceeding the target. However, this paper is
argues that there is an indication that Groups 2 and 3 are retaining too much cash
and not effectively utilizing liquid resources to respond to operating and capital
requirements because the target for both groups is well above the target of 1:1.
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Rates Coverage Ratio:
The Rates Coverage Ratio is a measure of the municipality’s ability to cover
its expenditures through its own revenue. Average Rates Coverage Ratios were
calculated and graphed in Table 4.
Table 4 indicates that all groups, on average, are exceeding the Rates
Coverage ratio. Group 2 and Group 3 are very closely aligned with a ratio between
65% and 70%. The Group 1 ratio is approximately 74%. Although these are strong
indicators for the Rates Coverage Ratio, Groups 2 and 3 are falling behind Group1
and potentially require assistance.
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Debt Service Coverage Ratio:
The Debt Service Coverage Ratio is a measure of a municipality’s ability to
service its debt payments. Municipalities can only incur debt for infrastructure
assets; debt cannot be incurred for operating expenses such as salaries and benefits.
Average Debt Service Coverage Ratios were calculated and graphed in Table 5.
Table 5 indicates that on average all groups are maintaining a healthy Debt
Service Coverage Ratio. Group 2’s trend is level, which would indicate that as old
debt is retired, new debt is acquired. This practice allows a municipality to maintain
and renew infrastructure assets with minimal impact on the municipal levy. The
chart indicates that Group 1 had a significant increase to debt levels between 2013
and 2014. This would indicate that Group 1 has taken an aggressive stance toward
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infrastructure renewal. However Group 3 has been trending upwards from the
target since 2013, which would indicate that this Group is not incurring any new
debt for infrastructure needs. This indicates that this group may be in receipt of
funds that could be distributed to other groups in need.

Asset Sustainability Ratio:
The Asset Sustainability Ratio is an approximation of the extent to which a
municipality is replacing, or acquiring new assets as existing infrastructure reaches
the end of its useful life. Average Asset Sustainability Ratios were calculated and
graphed in Table 6.
Table 6 indicates that, on average, municipalities are replacing and acquiring
new assets regularly. Group 1’s ratio trended toward the target prior to 2013 but
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from 2014 onward it is trending away from the target indicating that Group 1 is
replacing and acquiring assets. Group 2 and Group 3 has followed a similar pattern
as Group 1. However Group 2’s Asset Sustainability Ratio is trending toward the
target while Group 3’s ratio is trending away from the target. This indicates that
municipalities in Group 3 are replacing or acquiring assets more effectively than
municipalities in Group 2. This paper would argure that after assessing the average
Asset Sustainablity KPI of municipalites across the Province, the OCIF formula and
application-based grants are effectively targeting municipalities (Groups 2 and 3)
with infrastructure needs when compared to KPI of Group 1.
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Asset Consumption Ratio:
The Asset Consumption Ratio estimates the age of a municipality’s physical assets.
Average Asset Consumption Ratios were calculated and graphed in Table 7.
The Ministry’s target for Asset Consumption is less than 50% and all three
groups are well within the limit. However, on average, Group 1 is performing
approximately 14% better and the ratio is stable where Group 2 and 3 are closely
aligned and trending toward the limit. This paper would argure that after analyizing
the average Asset Consumption KPI across the Province, the OCIF formula and
application-based grants are effectively targeting municipalities (Groups 2 and 3)
with infrastructure needs but the impact of the grant is not yet reflected in Asset
Consumption Ratio on average.
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Group Case Analysis
In this section of the paper, the KPIs of selected individual municipalities will
be studied on a case-by-case basis. For each municipality there will be an
interpretation of the KPIs for the time frame leading up to OCIF and an assessment
of the impact of the first formula and the effectiveness of application-based grants
on its KPIs. Municipal KPIs that do not meet targets will be highlighted, in red, in the
tables below.
Group 1 Cases
Municipalities in Group 1 are ineligible for OCIF because populations exceed
100,000. For Group 1, with the exception of Current Ratios for Region of Durham,
Region of Halton, and City of Toronto (see Appendix B) all are performing well
according to the KPI measurement criteria. Most of the municipalities in Group 1 are
classified as advanced with respect to Operating Surplus Ratio indicating that these
municipalities have more than adequate resources to cover operational expenses
and fund capital infrastructure projects. The Province has made a fair assessment by
not providing any OCIF for Group 1 municipalities as the KPIs indicate there is
enough capacity to meet infrastructure needs without OCIF funding.
Group 2 Cases
Municipalities in Group 2 are eligible for OCIF but have only received the
formula-based component. There is no data available to determine if these
municipalities applied for and were refused application-based funding. County of
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Oxford and Township of Wellesley were selected for further analysis. Both Oxford
and Wellesley are in Group 2 but the KPIs for each are vastly different.
County of Oxford
For the years 2015 to 2019, the County of Oxford will receive $5,545,693
(2015 - $530,194; 2016 - $530,194; 2017 - $966,411; 2018 - $1,373,162; and 2019 $2,145,702) in formula-based OCIF funding. Prior to OCIF funding, all of Oxford’s
KPIs met or exceeded the KPI targets. Oxford’s Asset Sustainment Ratio is well
above the Ministry’s target of 90%. The Asset Consumption Ratio indicates that
Oxford has relatively new infrastructure.
Table 8 - COUNTY OF
OXFORD
Operating Surplus Ratio
(Target 0% to +15%)
Current Ratio
(Target >= 1:1)
Rates Coverage Ratio
(Target >= 40%)
Debt Service Coverage
Ratio (Target >= 2)
Asset Sustainability Ratio
(Target >90%)
Asset Consumption
(Target < 50%)

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

22.64%

26.50%

27.05%

31.68%

25.18%

4.45

6.30

6.45

7.30

7.28

71.96%

81.09%

76.16%

73.89%

74.35%

4.61

5.84

5.62

6.06

5.35

352.08%

125.23%

214.35%

156.63%

207.05%

32.78%

34.12%

34.17%

34.97%

35.30%

Township of Wellesley
For the years 2015 to 2019, the Township of Wellesley will receive
$1,391,468 (2015 - $141,423; 2016 - $141,423; 2017 - $242,708; 2018 - $343,279;
and 2019 - $522,635) in formula-based OCIF funding. Many of Wellesley’s KPIs
indicate a municipality that is struggling to meet its obligations. Revenue raised
does not adequately cover operating expenses nor would it adequately fund capital
investments. Wellesley’s Asset Sustainability Ratio is moving slowly in a positive
direction toward the target and the Asset Consumption Ration indicates that
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infrastructure is moderately old. However, the Debt Service Coverage ratio supports
that Wellesley can issue debt to fund infrastructure requirements.
Table 9 - TOWNSHIP
OF WELLESLEY
Operating Surplus Ratio
(Target 0% to +15%)
Current Ratio
(Target >= 1:1)
Rates Coverage Ratio
(Target >= 40%)
Debt Service Coverage
Ratio (Target >= 2)
Asset Sustainability Ratio
(Target >90%)
Asset Consumption
(Target < 50%)

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

-61.84%

-71.08%

-60.25%

-65.89%

-49.96%

3.31

3.37

2.87

2.06

2.89

46.11%

45.25%

45.99%

47.90%

49.61%

12.27

8.37

9.86

8.03

11.68

27.16%

26.56%

24.74%

38.81%

42.13%

56.49%

59.42%

62.09%

64.64%

67.09%

Given that Group 2 municipalities received the formula-based component of
OCIF and since the cases of Oxford and Wellesley contain very different KPI results,
this may indicate that the process is not benefiting all municipalities equally.
Group 3 Cases
Municipalities in Group 3 qualify for OCIF and have received the formulabased component as well as at least one Intake grant. Township of Plummer
Additional, Municipality of Highlands East, and City of Peterborough were selected
for further analysis. Again, Plummer Additional, Highland East, and Peterborough
are in Group 3 but the KPIs for each are vastly different.
Township of Plummer Additional
For the years 2015 to 2019, the Township of Plummer Additional will receive
$200,000 (2015 - $25,000; 2016 - $25,000; 2017 - $50,000; 2018 - $50,000; and
2019 - $50,000) in formula-based OCIF funding. Plummer Additional received a total
of $693,000 in application-based funding (Intake 1 - $ 346,500, and Intake 3 -
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$346,500). Although the Operating Surplus Ratio and Asset Sustainability Ratios
indicate improvement in 2015, many of Plummer Additional’s KPIs from 2011 to
2014 indicate a municipality that is challenged to meet its commitments. The Asset
Consumption Ratio for Plummer Additional’s suggests that its infrastructure is
moderately old and the Debt Service Ratio indicates that Plummer Additional has no
debt. Plummer Additional could incur debt to alleviate some infrastructure issues.
Table 10 TOWNSHIP OF
PLUMMER
ADDITIONAL
Operating Surplus Ratio
(Target 0% to +15%)
Current Ratio
(Target >= 1:1)
Rates Coverage Ratio
(Target >= 40%)
Debt Service Coverage
Ratio (Target >= 2)
Asset Sustainability Ratio
(Target >90%)
Asset Consumption
(Target < 50%)

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

-24.28%

-3.96%

-9.67%

-5.10%

11.42%

7.92

8.95

10.72

14.92

11.29

51.43%

60.32%

57.93%

58.85%

57.92%

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

86.08%

47.69%

83.27%

38.21%

127.85%

64.73%

67.18%

67.86%

70.45%

70.75%

Municipality of Highland East
For the years 2015 to 2019, the Municipality of Highland East will receive
$200,000 (2015 - $25,000; 2016 - $25,000; 2017 - $50,000; 2018 - $50,000; and
2019 - $50,000) in formula-based OCIF funding. Highland East received a total of
$851,534 in application-based funding (Intake 1 - $ 283,589 and Intake 2 $567,945). KPIs indicate that Highland East is financially healthy and has not issued
any debt.
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Table 11 MUNICIPALITY OF
HIGHLANDS EAST
Operating Surplus Ratio
(Target 0% to +15%)
Current Ratio
(Target >= 1:1)
Rates Coverage Ratio
(Target >= 40%)
Debt Service Coverage
Ratio (Target >= 2)
Asset Sustainability Ratio
(Target >90%)
Asset Consumption
(Target < 50%)

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

-1.39%

0.07%

5.58%

12.60%

13.46%

4.00

4.09

4.05

5.04

5.53

72.71%

76.30%

73.41%

79.17%

76.99%

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

126.35%

110.13%

159.23%

170.70%

134.24%

41.35%

42.93%

44.29%

43.92%

44.87%

City of Peterborough
For the years 2015 to 2019, the City of Peterborough will receive $5,287,009
(2015 - $457,719; 2016 - $457,719; 2017 - $934,977; 2018 - $1,331,308; and 2019 $2,105,286) in formula-based OCIF funding. Peterborough received a total of
$3,597,500 in application-based funding (Intake 1 - $ 1,597,500 and Intake 2 $2,000,000). Prior to OCIF, all of Peterborough’s KPIs indicate a municipality that
has more than adequate resources to fund operating and capital projects. The Asset
Consumption Ratio indicates that Peterborough’s infrastructure is relatively new.
Table 12 - CITY OF
PETERBOROUGH
Operating Surplus Ratio
(Target 0% to +15%)
Current Ratio
(Target >= 1:1)
Rates Coverage Ratio
(Target >= 40%)
Debt Service Coverage
Ratio (Target >= 2)
Asset Sustainability Ratio
(Target >90%)
Asset Consumption
(Target < 50%)

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

17.15%

16.29%

14.87%

11.95%

12.05%

3.75

4.04

2.99

2.49

2.20

64.64%

66.64%

65.40%

66.80%

64.43%

4.33

4.86

4.28

4.11

3.91

323.85%

248.97%

213.11%

200.24%

174.70%

39.42%

38.04%

38.61%

38.69%

39.47%

At the macro level, when KPIs are averaged to assess the effectiveness and
impact of OCIF on municipal KPIs it appears that the Province has apportioned the
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grant effectively to municipalities with infrastructure needs with the exception of
Debt Service Coverage Ratio for Group 3. It appears that this group received
substantial application-based funding when some of its infrastructure requirements
could have been funded by debt. However, at the micro level when assessing
individual municipalities, the OCIF is penalizing municipalities such as Wellesley,
and Plummer Additional and over compensating municipalities such as Oxford,
Peterborough, and Highland East. The human element of grant application review,
ranking and selection has favoured some municipalities more than others.

Application Effectiveness
After an analysis of municipal KPIs, it appears that the human element of
review, ranking, and selection of grant applications has produced a less than
equitable re-distribution of revenues from the Province to local governments. For
the application-based component of OCIF to be effective, the funding should have
benefited municipalities with poor KPIs with the goal that all municipalities have
similar KPIs. For example, municipalities with low KPIs would receive greater
amounts of funding until KPIs improve and municipalities with high KPIs would
receive low amounts of funding until KPIs start to deteriorate. Peterborough is an
example of a municipality with high KPIs yet it received almost $9 million in OCIF.
Was the Peterborough case an exercise in “value for money” for the Province? Was
there something else, beyond financial, happening with the City of Peterborough?
With these atypical cases identified, why would the Province not want to move to a
strictly formula-based, with conditions, grant model such as Canada Gas Tax for
OCIF?
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A formula-based grant allocation model would produce a defensible and
transparent allocation model. Councils want to know why their municipality did not
receive funds. A formula-based allocation would also ensure non-partisan grant
awards.
A second benefit to a formula-based grant system is reduced provincial
reporting. Provincial reporting is considered a drain on municipal resources.
Municipalities need to focus on modernization, effective delivery of services, and
infrastructure improvement (Lobo, 2017). Many application-based grants require
formal expressions of interest, complex applications, municipal competition for
funds, senior government review and ranking, grant financial audits, and final
project reporting. Formula-based grants, with conditions and reduced reporting,
allow municipalities to focus on what is important to communities.
A third benefit is predictable and stable funding. “Lack of predictable funding
makes it difficult for municipalities to plan expenditures. Capital grants, in
particular, need to be maintained for sufficiently long periods of time to allow
municipalities to sustain capital investments” (Slack E. , Provincial-Local Fiscal
Transfers in Canada, 2009, p. 28). For municipalities, the size of the grant is
important but for planning purposes, predictable and stable funding is essential.
A less obvious but important benefit is the reduction in need for professional
grant writers. Employees working for small municipalities must wear many “hats”
and the current skill set may not include grant writing. The upsurge of grant-writing
firms has placed small municipalities between a “rock and a hard place”. If the
municipality applies for the grant on its own, there is a danger it won’t be successful.
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If the municipality uses a grant-writing firm, there is a danger that it will be
successful and have to pay the hefty fee. Grants should be awarded based on
financial merit and need.
A formula-based grant provides local fiscal autonomy. The flexibility of
formula-based grants such as Canada Gas Tax allows for local fiscal autonomy.
Under Canada Gas Tax, municipalities can spend the grant as it choses as long as it is
spent on infrastructure improvements (AMO, 2017). Councils and management are
closer to needs of the community and residents providing a major benefit.
And lastly, formula-based grants eliminate the potential of municipal gaming
– purposely ignoring the maintenance of an asset with the hope that the Province
will step in with funding.
Although there are strong benefits of formula-based grant systems there are
also strong arguments for application-based funding. Canada as a country is too
large and diverse to effectively allocate funds through an application process. Due to
the vast diversity of the country, the Federal government chose an easy method to
allocate Canada Gas Tax funds, which is also easy to understand. The Province has a
better understanding of the unique infrastructure pressures of local government
making the application process effective.
There may be political reasons for an application-based system. The Province
may want to keep the application process in place due to the potential for grant
awards to buy votes from opposition-held ridings.
Councils have an interest in re-election. The drive to remain on Council may
create an environment of poor decision-making. Spending must take into
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consideration value for money to ensure effective use of resources. Municipalities
are creatures of the Province and the Province needs to maintain control over funds.
If AMPs were standardized the Province could utilize the data to effectively
target municipalities that are in need of infrastructure assistance. With standardized
AMPs, similar to the FIR, the Province would have an effective tool to:
1) Target municipalities with infrastructure needs,
2) Measure the performance of recipients, and
3) Hold municipalities and Councils responsible for capital spending and
infrastructure deficits.

47

Conclusion
Small and rural municipalities are facing infrastructure deficits due to the
inability to raise sufficient funds through property taxes. Federal and Provincial
governments collect 92 cents of every tax dollar and must step in to re-distribute
revenues to local governments for infrastructure needs.
The goal of this research was to determine if the Province has enough
financial and statistical data available to execute a needs-based grant allocation to
target municipalities with infrastructure needs instead of an application process.
Currently, the Province has data from the FIR, which contains a wealth of
information that could be used to assess the financial health of each municipality.
The data from the 2015 FIR was not sufficient to provide a new model to allocate
both the formula and application components of OCIF.
A secondary goal of this paper was to investigate the effectiveness of the
OCIF formula and application-based grant. The Province does use data to allocate a
portion of OCIF through the formula-based component and uses an application
process to allocate the balance. However, upon review of the financial KPIs of
municipalities, there is an indication that the OCIF process is not benefiting all
municipalities equally and leaving some municipalities behind.
While no revenue re-distribution method is perfect, the Province can do a
better job allocating funds to municipalities with real infrastructure needs with
better data. A standardized AMP would give the Province the ability to target
municipalities with infrastructure needs, measure performance of recipients, and
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hold Councils responsible while at the same time provide municipalities and
communities with much needed local autonomy.
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